



# SIPP

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The  
**Scholar  
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**Managing Complexity:  
The Lessons of Horizontal  
Policy-Making in the Provinces**

**Ian Peach  
Spring / Summer 2004**



UNIVERSITY OF  
**REGINA**

**Managing Complexity:  
The Lessons of Horizontal Policy-Making in the Provinces**

Mr. Ian Peach  
SIPP Government of Saskatchewan Senior Fellow  
2003-04

Public Lecture at the  
Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy  
June 8, 2004

## **The Scholar Series**

Each year the Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy benefits enormously from the appointment of two Senior Fellows, one from the University of Regina and the other from the Government of Saskatchewan. The fellowships are each for twelve months, and are designed to recognise scholars and practitioners who have made significant contributions in the area of public policy. During their year at SIPP, the Fellows pursue their public policy research interests and participate in the various activities of the Institute.

Towards the conclusion of their appointment, each Fellow presents a public lecture on the research they have undertaken during their term at SIPP. Such lectures are published in our Scholar Series, thereby disseminating to a wide audience the ideas and contributions of the Fellows.

For his public lecture, Mr. Ian Peach, the 2003-04 Government of Saskatchewan Senior Fellow, turns to the important issues of “horizontal” policy processes across Canada, comparing them to that of similar American jurisdictions and the United Kingdom. In this wide-ranging discussion, Mr. Peach identifies new ways to effectively address multi-faceted social and economic challenges through policy development.

Dr. Raymond B. Blake

Director, Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy

**Managing Complexity:  
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**Ian Peach  
SIPP Government of Saskatchewan Senior Fellow**

**Introduction**

With jurisdictions increasingly in competition with one another for investment and economic growth, governments have come under more intense questioning about how they could be more effective in harnessing their resources to address seemingly intractable social problems or maximize the public value created by public sector expenditures. The public and the politicians they elect to govern are increasingly seeking ways to improve, simultaneously, the effectiveness, efficiency, equity, responsiveness, and accountability of government.<sup>1</sup> Too often, however, governments fail to achieve the social objectives they claim are at the core of their purpose, such as healthy and educated citizens, strong economies, and social order. The all too apparent failure to meet these reasonable expectations of citizens for many sectors of the population has led to deeper questions about the effectiveness of government as a tool of social ordering.

There is a rapidly growing body of literature and practice, often collected under the rubric of “new public management”, on new models of policy-making that are designed to achieve the goal of addressing multi-faceted social problems effectively, thereby helping to reverse the decline in public confidence in the ability of governments to actually create public value. One of the most radical of these innovations is variously known as “joined-up government”, “horizontal management”, “key cross-government strategies”, and a number of other labels. Whatever the name that is used in a particular jurisdiction, each is seeking to achieve the same fundamental public administration goal through similar procedural innovations: to make government more

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\* The author would like to thank the staff and Fellows of the Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, Leslie Pal of Carleton University, and Ken Rasmussen and Greg Marchildon of the University of Regina for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. He would also like to thank the officials of the various provincial governments who, while anonymous, are greatly appreciated for providing such valuable insights into the efforts of their provincial governments to institute horizontal policy-making and Leslie Higginson for transcribing the interviews with government officials. Any errors and omissions that remain are solely those of the author.

responsive to citizen needs and expectations by addressing multi-faceted social challenges with multi-faceted, coordinated responses. As Perri 6, et al have described it:

The first job of government is not to administer transactions, but to solve problems. The problems that people care about are not defined or shaped in the same way that departments and agencies are, and when government reform focuses only on smooth administration, real problems fall between the gaps. ... Today the goal is holistic or 'joined-up' government. Governments in Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and many state and local governments in the United States, spent the mid-1990s looking for ways to integrate government around the problems, solutions and outcomes that citizens wanted.<sup>2</sup>

This actually entails three separate tasks: improving the coordination of government policies across government departments, improving the coordination of different levels of government and bringing government and citizens together in policy development, through deliberation, and policy implementation. In the absence of such coordination, different agencies or levels of government risk developing policies or administrative systems that work at cross purposes with those of other agencies or levels of government, do not respond to citizens' desires for effective government, or make policy and program delivery daunting for those social actors (often voluntary organizations) that are increasingly the delivery agents of government programs.

To join up government effectively, though, requires policy-makers to confront directly a bureaucratic culture that is the continuing legacy of the professionalization of public administration in the 1930s. The traditional understanding of public administration puts a premium on the creation of expertise within a series of departments or agencies that divide the task of governing into specialized functions that reflect particular professional disciplines. In this traditional model, management and accountability functions are arranged vertically within departments. There is little room in this model for inter-agency collaboration in defining social problems and making policies to address them, let alone for the involvement of citizens in policy deliberation. As Bardach notes, "Almost nothing about the bureaucratic ethos makes it hospitable to interagency collaboration."<sup>3</sup>

In spite of this, there is every reason to believe that well-designed strategies to foster horizontal policy-making can work, particularly if governments and civil society organizations make a serious commitment to defining a set of desired social outcomes and focussing their actions on achieving those outcomes. Getting governments and society focussed on such shared

objectives and, more importantly, keeping them focussed on the objectives requires both reforms to governmental processes and strong leadership that can induce all parties to act together to achieve the objectives. If successful, though, horizontal policy processes can provide public managers with access to increased resources through the pooling of budgets, improve their understanding of the multi-dimensional nature of clients' problems, increase trust between agencies by identifying common interests and the need for ongoing relationships and can reduce the "passing" of high-cost clients with seemingly intractable problems from agency to agency until they give up and stop seeking government services to which they have a right.<sup>4</sup>

What actions can governments take to change bureaucratic cultures and effectively create a holistic government response to holistic public policy challenges? While numerous jurisdictions have made efforts at "joined-up" policy-making, their experiences, and analyses of those experiences, have too rarely been disseminated within the public policy community. The Canadian Centre for Management Development identified three critical needs that the study of horizontal management has yet to adequately fill -- the need to distil practical advice, the need to share real experiences, and the need to acknowledge the continuing real-world difficulties of managing horizontally and address the concrete institutional and cultural obstacles to improving horizontal management.<sup>5</sup>

To help fill these gaps, this study reviews best practices in horizontal policy development processes from provincial governments in Canada to determine to what degree the management challenges and solutions are common across governments, and assess what factors are critical to the success or failure of these experiments. One must acknowledge, at the outset, that has also been a great deal written at the federal level in Canada on horizontal management. As, however, the majority of practical experience with innovations to foster horizontal policy-making, as distinct from integrated service delivery, is situated in the provinces, this study will focus on horizontal policy-making at this level of government. To provide a critical assessment of Canadian provincial government innovations, though, the study also compares their experience to that of several state governments in the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom in implementing horizontal management initiatives in their jurisdictions.

## **Horizontal Policy-Making in Canada: Lessons from the Provinces**

Numerous provinces have designed interdepartmental or cross-government policy frameworks to encourage horizontal policy-making and delivery in both human services and economic development fields. A brief look at government websites reveals horizontal policy frameworks from coast to coast to coast, in small provinces such as Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Saskatchewan, large provinces such as Alberta and Ontario, and in the Northwest Territories. The sheer number of provinces experimenting with horizontal policy-making provides an excellent base of information on which to assess how horizontal policy-making can be implemented within government. It also allows one to draw some conclusions about the effect of successful horizontal policy making the bureaucratic culture of provincial governments, policy coordination between orders of government, and the relationship between government and non-governmental organizations and citizens. This study reviews the experience of six provinces (Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta), based on both documentary evidence and direct interviews with provincial government officials, to determine what practices and mechanisms have made for successful horizontal policy-making.

While the horizontal policy initiatives in the various provinces and the processes used to develop them exhibit many differences in detail, there is a remarkable coherence among them in how they have made horizontal policy initiatives part of the public administration environment of their provinces. In every case, horizontal policy initiatives are built around a results-oriented framework that provides a focus for the actions of governmental and non-governmental actors. In each province, the commitment of the Cabinets and the central agencies of government have been essential to both creating and sustaining the bureaucracies' commitment to horizontal policy-making. As well, with the notable exception of Prince Edward Island, changes to processes, for example budget processes or the performance evaluation of senior officials, have been part of the repertoire of the provinces that have effectively implemented horizontal policy-making initiatives. Lastly, every jurisdiction reviewed has sought to engage either stakeholders or the public at large more seriously in the policy-making process, often through the creative use of non-governmental, or joint government-stakeholder, boards. The records of the different jurisdictions also make it clear that these changes lead to results. While this type of policy-making is still new enough in Canada that it is difficult to demonstrate that horizontal policy-

making is having a meaningful impact on social outcomes, there is some evidence beginning to appear that this is, indeed, the case. Where clear progress is being made in all of the jurisdictions, however, is in creating a more collaborative, results-focussed and holistic bureaucratic culture and increasing citizens' faith in government as a vehicle through which social progress can be achieved.

a) *Newfoundland and Labrador*

Of all the provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador may have the most ambitious horizontal policy-making process. In 1998, the province released a document entitled *People, Partners and Prosperity: A Strategic Social Plan for Newfoundland and Labrador*. This is a comprehensive strategic plan for the province, the centrepiece of which is four goals: vibrant communities and regions in which people actively participate in their collective well-being; sustainable regions based on strategic investment in individuals, families and communities; self-reliant, healthy, educated individuals and families living in safe, nurturing communities; and integrated and evidence-based policy development and monitoring as the foundation for the design, delivery and evaluation of social development programs and services.<sup>6</sup> The plan was the result of a consultation process that began with the release of the *Strategic Social Plan Consultation Paper* in June 1996.<sup>7</sup> The consultation process was conducted by a Social Policy Advisory Committee of fourteen volunteers appointed by the government.<sup>8</sup> After extensive consultations, the committee prepared two reports: *Volume I: What the People Said*, released in March 1997, reported on the consultations and *Volume II: Investing in People and Communities, A Framework for Social Development*, released in April 1997, proposed new strategic directions and initiatives.<sup>9</sup> In response to these reports, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador formed special ministerial and interdepartmental committees to develop the Strategic Social Plan.<sup>10</sup>

*People, Partners and Prosperity* was explicitly premised on the view that effective solutions to Newfoundland and Labrador's socio-economic challenges required better policy coordination among government departments, increased cooperation with community groups in policy development and delivery, and planned investments in initiatives that will effect long-term solutions.<sup>11</sup> To achieve this, the Social Policy Committee of Cabinet, along with the Chair of the Economic Policy Committee of Cabinet, the Minister of Finance and the President of the

Treasury Board, and the Chair of the Cabinet Committee on Rural Revitalization, was mandated to ensure that social and economic policy are integrated, that the business of government is conducted in a way that supports coordination, integration and accountability for results, that meaningful public input is part of policy development and delivery, that regions' capacity to support community action is strengthened, and that policy-making shifts from responding to crises to preventing them.<sup>12</sup> As well, the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet for Social Policy was given the task of providing support to the bureaucracy in implementing the plan and was to act as the central contact point for the plan in government.<sup>13</sup> A Council on Social Development, appointed by the Premier, was also established to provide ongoing advice to the government from outside government.<sup>14</sup> *People, Partners and Prosperity* also recognized the importance of engaging the federal government in regular dialogue to improve intergovernmental collaboration and clarify the roles and responsibilities of the two orders of government.<sup>15</sup>

One of the key components of the Strategic Social Plan is the "Social Audit", through which the government would track 20 indicators of well-being, employment and economic security, and community stability.<sup>16</sup> The first step in the Social Audit was the publication, in 2002, of *From the Ground Up*, which provided baseline measures against which progress on the various indicators could be measured.<sup>17</sup> The most innovative aspect of the Social Audit, however, is the creation of "Community Accounts", which track progress on the indicators at a province-wide, regional and community-specific level and which are available to anyone through the internet.<sup>18</sup>

Public engagement is an important part of the Strategic Social Plan and the Social Audit. The initial consultations on the Strategic Social Plan were undertaken not by government but by a citizens' committee, the Social Policy Advisory Committee, and another citizens' committee, the Premier's Council on Social Development, was created to monitor ongoing implementation of the plan. As well, the level of public access to data related to the Strategic Social Plan goals, through the Community Accounts, is remarkable and reflects the seriousness of the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador's commitment to public engagement. It is also interesting to note that the 2003 change in government in Newfoundland and Labrador has seemingly had no impact on the Strategic Social Plan; it is likely that the level of public involvement in, and consequent public support for, the plan has insulated it from partisan challenge.

A second important aspect of the Strategic Social Plan is that it has a strategic framework and robust set of performance indicators against which all parties involved in horizontal policy-making can plan and monitor ongoing implementation of the plan. The Community Accounts are the most important element of this framework in Newfoundland and Labrador. They allow central government and communities to connect what might otherwise be separate planning processes by providing a common data set that is detailed enough to be useful to community-level planners.<sup>19</sup>

Leadership from Cabinet and central agencies has also been critical to the Strategic Social Plan's development and implementation. In the Newfoundland and Labrador government, an office within Executive Council has been assigned overall responsibility for the Strategic Social Plan, while the Department of Finance is responsible for the Community Accounts. Central agency responsibility for these broad-based initiatives is insufficient, however; departments with service delivery responsibilities have had to take the need for better coordination seriously. Central agencies have helped ensure this, too, though, by assisting departments in building their capacity to make policy more cooperatively and strategically. As well, the oversight of the Strategic Social Plan by a Cabinet Committee clearly sends the signal to the bureaucracy that their performance in cooperating to achieve the goals of the plan will be monitored at the highest level on an ongoing basis. This will help secure a continued commitment from within the bureaucracy to horizontal policy-making in support of the plan, as will the plan's public profile.

*b) Prince Edward Island*

Prince Edward Island has several broad, cross-departmental strategic frameworks, most notably on healthy child development, healthy living and family violence prevention, though there has also been cross-departmental policy integration on such issues as climate change and sustainable development. The Strategy for Healthy Child Development, with four outcomes-focussed goals, was launched in 2000, and a Premier's Council on Healthy Child Development, a citizens' advisory body, was established in 2001.<sup>20</sup> The Strategy has been conceived as being "collectively owned" by several government departments, communities, business, the voluntary sector, parents and families and has been the subject of extensive consultations.<sup>21</sup> The first annual "Children's Think Tank" was held in November 2001, to identify priority areas for action and build working relationships across sectors, a website was launched at the Think Tank and the

government and the University of Prince Edward Island hosted web-based early childhood development discussions.<sup>22</sup> The Council now provides annual reports on the progress of the Strategy for Healthy Child Development that include reporting on a number of indicators related to the goals.<sup>23</sup>

Both the 2001 Family Violence Prevention Five-Year Strategy and the 2002 Prince Edward Island Strategy for Healthy Living follow a similar format. The Strategy for Healthy Living, for example, is a strategic framework of five goals and a number of targets, indicators and strategic initiatives.<sup>24</sup> It was developed through consultations by the provincial government with local government and non-governmental organizations and announced in the 2002 Prince Edward Island Speech from the Throne.<sup>25</sup> It is now managed by a steering committee with representation of several provincial government departments, local authorities (including school boards and health regions), and non-governmental organizations.<sup>26</sup>

These strategies reflect a desire on the part of Prince Edward Island officials to develop a more holistic approach to planning, identifying priority programs and services, and evaluating programs.<sup>27</sup> The overall view of officials within the Prince Edward Island Executive Council is that their efforts have proven successful; most notably, they have seen the development of a culture among Deputy Ministers in the provincial government that allows officials to "give up" program responsibilities and funding for the sake of making an interdepartmental partnership more effective in achieving its overall objectives.<sup>28</sup>

One of the factors that Prince Edward Island officials identified as having led to successful horizontal policy-making initiatives in the province is clear strategic direction; where the direction was not as clear, they noted that it has been difficult to see progress.<sup>29</sup> They also noted that leadership from Cabinet and Executive Council has been important in bringing cross-government leadership to the task of horizontal policy-making but, because of the limited human resources capacity of Executive Council, the commitment of the senior management across the provincial government has been the key source of leadership.<sup>30</sup> Possibly in part because of the province's small size, and the small size of its government, Prince Edward Island officials have relied much more on the quality of relationships among the senior management and other officials in the provincial government than on formal processes to generate incentives to cooperate.<sup>31</sup>

Like other governments, however, the Prince Edward Island government consults extensively with organizations and residents of the province in both developing and monitoring its policy initiatives.<sup>32</sup> Officials also noted that the level of coordination they have been able to achieve, both across the provincial government and between the government and island residents, has allowed the provincial government to bring federal government policies in line with the provincial policy frameworks, thereby improving federal-provincial coordination.<sup>33</sup>

c) *Nova Scotia*

Nova Scotia's highest profile efforts at horizontal policy-making have been in economic policy, rather than social policy, though there have also been horizontal initiatives in such areas as health promotion and children and youth. The overarching economic development strategy is entitled *Opportunities for Prosperity: A New Economic Growth Strategy for Nova Scotians*. Published in October 2000, it is a ten-year strategic framework for economic growth that arose out of extensive public consultations begun in the spring of that year.<sup>34</sup> In the consultations, people stressed the importance of all governments helping communities take charge of their economic development and their desire to be part of policy and program decisions.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the economic growth strategy is guided by a set of principles that included collaboration among all orders of government and between government and citizens; it is also committed to accountability for results, through the articulation of a policy framework and clear reporting on progress.<sup>36</sup> *Opportunities for Prosperity* identified a number of baseline statistics, set out seven goals, or "strategic directions", and defined an initial action plan.<sup>37</sup> Progress was reported on in the spring of 2003, in *Opportunities for Prosperity: A Progress Report*, though it sometimes simply reports on activities, rather than progress against the baseline statistics contained in the original *Opportunities for Prosperity* document.<sup>38</sup>

*Opportunities for Prosperity* also announced that the provincial Department of Economic Development would be replaced by two organizations, which would better reflect this commitment to collaboration. The first organization, Nova Scotia Business Inc., has a Board of Directors made up of individuals from the private sector and was assigned the task of managing and coordinating the province's business development functions.<sup>39</sup> The other organization, which it was proposed would be called the Nova Scotia Economic Development Agency but which continued to be called the Department of Economic Development, is a coordinating

agency within government with a mandate to manage government activities in support of economic development and improve interdepartmental coordination.<sup>40</sup> The two agencies work in close partnership with one another. The economic growth strategy has also spawned a number of related strategies on more specific elements of economic growth, such as innovation, skill development, the energy sector, and community development, each of which has a strategic framework of goals and objectives and is implemented through a non-governmental advisory body or some other form of on-going stakeholder consultation.<sup>41</sup>

Officials in Nova Scotia have focussed on the importance of four factors in determining the success of their horizontal policy initiatives: leadership, structures and processes, public or stakeholder involvement, and patience. Whether the impetus for a horizontal initiative came from a line department, a central agency, or Ministers, success requires the existence of an underlying philosophy of collaboration and department-central agency partnerships to support horizontal initiatives.<sup>42</sup> In the case of the community development strategy, the impetus came from the Deputy Minister of Economic Development, in response to the government's commitments, but the Treasury and Policy Board branch of Nova Scotia Executive Council provided a valuable service by reviewing the concept early in its development, offering some advice on opportunities for its improvement, and providing the department with assistance in meeting the management challenges of creating and implementing a policy collaboratively across departments.<sup>43</sup> One of the strategies Nova Scotia Economic Development used to generate support for the community development strategy across the government was conceptualizing the strategy in a way that would assist other departments, such as Agriculture and Fisheries or Tourism and Culture, in responding effectively to their policy challenges, not just Economic Development's.<sup>44</sup> As well, the Premier's involvement in the community development strategy at the beginning of the process gave the initiative a public profile that helped secure support both at the political level and within the bureaucracy.<sup>45</sup>

This leadership, however, required the creation of supporting structures to make policy development both truly horizontal and effective. Initially, the weekly forum of Deputy Ministers provided the opportunity for the Deputy Minister of Economic Development to engage other departments in initial conceptualization of the community development strategy and, once the concept was accepted, a Deputy Ministers' Steering Committee and a Community Development Advisory Group of officials were created to undertake the collaborative development of the

strategy.<sup>46</sup> Officials felt that such structures are essential as, without them, it is difficult to retain the momentum necessary to effectively implement the policy.<sup>47</sup> As well, Nova Scotia Economic Development has assigned staff specifically to lead the implementation of the community development framework.<sup>48</sup>

Beyond collaborative structures, two other processes to foster horizontal collaboration were seen by Nova Scotia officials to be important. They noted that previous attempts to create horizontal policy by making use of departments' existing budgets led to inconsistent levels of commitment to the policy framework, so they were planning to seek funds specifically earmarked for the new policies, and have the interdepartmental committees responsible for managing those policies allocate the funds against the strategic policy framework.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, one Nova Scotia official identified the tendency of departments to "protect" their budgets from the influence of decisions made outside the department as the biggest management challenge facing horizontal policy-making.<sup>50</sup> Secondly, the government is attempting to create a system in which the quality of the participation of each department involved in a horizontal policy initiative becomes part of each Deputy Minister's performance review, rather than making the lead Deputy Minister wholly responsible for the success or failure of the initiative.<sup>51</sup>

Nova Scotia has made extensive use of public consultation and stakeholder engagement exercises as part of its horizontal policy-making efforts. In the economic development field, one of the most successful stakeholder engagement mechanisms is Voluntary Planning, an arms-length community planning board. Voluntary Planning has been responsible for a number of consultation exercises on a variety of issues and their arms-length nature has helped bring legitimacy to the consultations.<sup>52</sup> Nova Scotia Health has also found it useful to create smaller bodies of governmental and non-governmental organization officials to jointly address a subset of closely related issues, with major consultations to initiate the policy-making process and to draw together the results of the small-group discussions into an overall policy framework.<sup>53</sup> Follow-up to consultations is also critical to bringing legitimacy to the consultation process and to the process of policy development more generally. Nova Scotia officials have found that initiating a consultation process with a discussion paper on a policy issue and concluding it with a report back to all participants in the consultation outlining the policy both focusses the consultation and secures the legitimacy of the consultation process, thereby maximizing the

value of public and stakeholder engagement in both policy development and policy implementation.<sup>54</sup>

The fourth factor Nova Scotia officials identified as important to the success of horizontal policy-making is patience.<sup>55</sup> Building a coherent policy framework across a number of departments often requires lead officials to gradually secure a series of small agreements and commitments from the partners that allows the lead partner to build a horizontal policy framework and effectively implement it. This, obviously, takes time, especially when intergovernmental coordination and public engagement in policy-making and delivery are part of the agenda; tangible results, such as new budget allocations to support the policy, may not appear in the short term. Taking the time to solidify relationships and develop a shared sense of commitment to the policy, however, will secure the long-term stability of the partnership; this, in turn, will allow the partnership to provide a higher quality of critical analysis of proposed initiatives and generate better policy. Indeed, one Nova Scotia official suggested that, when it comes to building intergovernmental cooperation, smaller provinces can be more successful because they work harder at building intergovernmental relationships, given the size of the federal government's presence in those provinces.<sup>56</sup> When the federal government devolves responsibility for policy development to the regional level, and especially in cases where there is an intergovernmental structure that can be the locus for joint planning and coordination, this can lead to successful intergovernmental horizontality; too often, however, policy decisions made in Ottawa, in the absence of adequate regional sensitivity, lead to disruptions in intergovernmental relationships in the regions and inappropriate policies.<sup>57</sup>

#### *d) Ontario*

Ontario's highest-profile horizontal strategy is Smart Growth, the province's sustainable development strategy. Developed through public consultations in the spring of 2001 from the provincial government's vision for sustainable growth, Smart Growth is a policy framework of six goals for growth, infrastructure development, competitiveness, transportation, environmental protection, and community development.<sup>58</sup> The strategy to support these goals has been developed and implemented through a partnership between the Smart Growth Secretariat within government, which is, itself, a partnership among ten Ontario departments and agencies, and five regional Smart Growth Panels, made up of individuals from local governments, business,

stakeholders, and the communities.<sup>59</sup> The Smart Growth Panels will act as the link between individual communities and the provincial government, by consulting with community leaders in their regions and providing advice to the Ministry of Public Infrastructure.<sup>60</sup> Smart Growth has also spawned horizontal initiatives in particular sectors; the most notable of these under the previous Ontario government was SuperBuild, which pooled infrastructure planning and budgets in a single agency, SuperBuild Corporation, that worked in partnership with individual departments and other orders of government to create and fund a horizontal, strategic infrastructure plan. While the current Ontario government has replaced SuperBuild Corporation with a Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, it is clear from the government's February 2004 discussion paper on infrastructure financing and procurement that the commitment to long-term, horizontal strategic planning and financing for infrastructure renewal, and its linkage to Smart Growth, remains.<sup>61</sup>

Smart Growth reflects a deeper desire within the Ontario government to foster more collaborative, horizontal policy-making. Ontario officials have indicated that the effective collaboration is increasingly becoming a core competency for senior management within the Ontario public service and is appearing in senior officials' performance contracts.<sup>62</sup> The performance of whole departments, too, in collaborating across government has been subject to review by the Cabinet Office, which identifies weaknesses and provides support to improve future collaboration.<sup>63</sup> As well, Ontario has established "policy clusters", and the Deputy Ministers of departments with responsibilities in a cluster meet regularly to discuss their policy agendas, share data on issues and trends, and collaborate in policy-making and "business planning". Smart Growth's use of external panels also demonstrates that Ontario, like other provinces, is interested in engaging the public in the policy process as part of horizontal policy-making.

#### *e) Saskatchewan*

Saskatchewan was an early proponent of horizontal policy-making. It began to develop a process for making policy through interdepartmental cooperation as early as 1996 in the Assistant Deputy Ministers' Forum on Human Services (now known as the Human Services Integration Forum). The first fully developed horizontal policy frameworks with tangible, outcome-focussed goals were the Métis and off-reserve First Nations Peoples Strategy (now

known as the *Framework for Cooperation*) and the Northern Strategy. Both of these received initial Cabinet approval in the spring of 1998 and were, subsequently, subject to further development through stakeholder or public consultations.

By 2001, enough experience had been gained in attempting to develop and implement policy horizontally under both of these strategies, as well as the later Early Childhood Development Strategy and the economic development strategy *Partnership for Prosperity*, that Saskatchewan Executive Council and Saskatchewan Finance developed a formal planning and budgeting process for what became known as "key cross-government strategies". The two central agencies identified a number of management challenges that the government's experience with these four early experiments revealed: the lack of a consistent definition of what constitutes an interdepartmental strategy; unclear lines of accountability; a focus on funding interdepartmental strategies through incremental expenditures; weak links between policy and financial decisions; a limited use of performance measures and evaluation; and, generally, weak incentives to cooperate in implementing an interdepartmental policy to ensure that the desired results are achieved.<sup>64</sup>

The new process was designed to address each of these issues. Central agency officials and Ministers saw that demonstrating, and sustaining, central agency and political commitment to horizontal policy-making is important if the bureaucratic culture of the government is to change from a "silo" mentality to a collaborative, results-focussed mentality and they ensured that the process would signal their commitment. The process itself was designed by a team from Executive Council and Finance and transmitted to departments by the Deputy Minister to the Premier and the Deputy Minister of Finance, Executive Council and Finance were given an ongoing role in overseeing the development and implementation of these strategies, and reports were to be provided annually to both a Cabinet policy committee and Treasury Board on each key cross-government strategy.<sup>65</sup> As well, the key cross-government strategies were to be considered by all Deputy Ministers at their annual retreat, as part of their consideration of the government's overall policy agenda.<sup>66</sup>

Effectively, the processes to be used for developing, monitoring, reporting on, and reviewing the key cross-government strategies were designed to treat these strategies as the equal of departmental strategic plans in the planning and budgeting process, to overcome the tendency of the bureaucracy to view collaborative work as less important than work directly related to the

goals of one's department. The importance of having a well-developed strategic framework, with goals and objectives that reflected desired social outcomes, measurable indicators of performance, and an action plan to achieve the objectives had become accepted strategic planning wisdom in Saskatchewan by 2001, so all of these elements were to be required of the key cross-government strategies, in the same way they were required of departmental strategic plans.<sup>67</sup> These strategies also had to explain how they supported the government's overall strategic direction, to further link the horizontal strategies to government-wide planning.<sup>68</sup>

A further process requirement reflected a recognition of the importance of having clear lines of accountability from partner departments, through the lead department or agency, to Cabinet. To ensure accountability, and the incentives for performance that accountability provides, each key cross-government strategy must also contain an accountability statement that delineates the roles and responsibilities of all departments involved.<sup>69</sup> Generally, the lead department is responsible for coordinating the development of the strategy and for monitoring and reporting on overall results, while partner departments are responsible for the identification and delivery of actions that support the strategy and for reporting on the results of those actions.<sup>70</sup> In this way, Cabinet would be able both to see the strategy as a coherent whole and to hold particular departments accountable for the outcomes of their contributions. Officials had considered taking this accountability statement concept a step further, by creating "accountability contracts" between the partner departments' Deputy Ministers and the lead department's Deputy Minister, as well as between the lead department's Deputy Minister and the Deputy Minister to the Premier, but a more gradual formalization of accountability relationships was considered more likely to be accepted by the bureaucracy. Accountability for performance on key cross-government strategies is also secured by including reference to them in the Deputy Minister to the Premier's performance reviews of departmental Deputy Ministers, though the weight to be given to this factor in a Deputy Minister's overall performance review has not been formalized.

The budget process for the key cross-government strategies was also intended to put these policy frameworks on an equal footing for budgeting purposes with departmental budget submissions. A critical component of the process was that the key cross-government strategies were to be given expenditure ranges against which the departments involved in a strategy could construct a financial plan against, as is done for departments.<sup>71</sup> The theory behind this was two-fold: the process would bring an end to the privileging of departmental expenditures and the

treatment of these strategies, which were meant to be a more effective way to achieve the government's overall objectives, as "afterthoughts", and it would generate an internal competition among the departments participating in a key cross-government strategy to propose the most effective initiatives to advance the strategy, as each department sought to capture the maximum possible proportion of the strategy's budget. Probably the critical weakness undermining Saskatchewan's ability to effectively develop and implement policy horizontally is that this proposed budget process for key cross-government strategies has largely been ignored, thereby removing an important incentive for departments to continue to participate in collaborative policy development and implementation. The strategies are, however, reviewed by Treasury Board separately in the budget process, even where a separate expenditure range has not been provided.

While it was not considered an inherent part of the planning process for the key cross-government strategies, Saskatchewan has, in several cases, effectively used public consultations and stakeholder planning partnerships as both a horizontal policy development tool and a tool to improve the implementation of horizontal policies, once developed. The provincial government has also had some success in using horizontal policies to improve intergovernmental policy coordination, though the results have been decidedly mixed. The best example of both improved government-stakeholder coordination and intergovernmental coordination through Saskatchewan's use of a horizontal policy framework, as well as the most innovative stakeholder engagement process, is likely the Northern Strategy. The Northern Strategy was both developed by and is being implemented under the direction of a Northern Development Board, on which the federal and provincial governments and representatives of northern Saskatchewan's First Nations, Métis and municipal leaders operate as partners. This format was purposely designed to bring together all northern political leaders and the federal and provincial governments in a common policy development process to support northern economic and social development. Provincial government officials hoped that this would replace competition, both between the two orders of public government and between northern First Nations, Métis and municipal leaders, with cooperative planning to achieve a number of shared goals. As well, as with other provinces, stakeholder and citizen engagement has helped to put Saskatchewan's horizontal strategies on a firmer footing in the competition for government's priorities, and attendant expenditures, than they might otherwise have had.

*f) Alberta*

Of all the provinces reviewed here, Alberta is the most advanced in building a horizontal policy-making culture and integrating it into a government-wide "business planning" model. Alberta has four "priority policy initiatives", on Aboriginal policy, economic development, health sustainability, and children and youth, that are designed to assist in achieving a government-wide agenda.<sup>72</sup> These were developed after the government's departmental three-year business plans were put in place because the government recognized that something more was needed to overcome departmental silos and link the agendas of the various departments into a government-wide business plan.<sup>73</sup>

Alberta's horizontal policy initiatives demonstrate both central and collective leadership. The original impetus for developing these initiatives came directly from the Premier, who was concerned about duplication, overlap, and a general lack of interdepartmental collaboration, and the initiatives are approved and monitored by Cabinet, which is given annual updates on their progress.<sup>74</sup> They are also part of Alberta's government-wide business plan and progress is reported in the government's Annual Report.<sup>75</sup> A committee of Deputy Ministers is responsible for ensuring that Cabinet's direction is carried out, while each initiative is managed by a Deputy Minister's steering group of three to five members, with one Deputy Minister as the initiative's "champion", and one or more sub-committees of Assistant Deputy Ministers.<sup>76</sup>

The priority policy initiatives reflect the highly developed strategic planning model used throughout the Government of Alberta. The planning process starts with an environmental scan of trends and issues facing the government, which allows officials to define a strategic response to horizontal policy issues.<sup>77</sup> Each horizontal initiative has a set of objectives and targets against which progress can be measured, though officials recognize that specifying measurable outcomes, especially for initiatives that may take many years to have a measurable impact on social outcomes, is a significant challenge.<sup>78</sup> In response to this challenge, Alberta uses a mixture of outcome and output (i.e. service delivery) targets as interim objectives in cases where one can predict with some confidence that the outputs will have an eventual positive impact on the outcomes.<sup>79</sup> As Alberta's Cabinet Secretary and Deputy Minister of Executive Council has stated, "The key point is to set a process in motion and to do fine-tuning and adjustments as we go along."<sup>80</sup>

Alberta officials have indicated that the biggest and most fundamental challenge is getting departments to work together effectively and take a corporate view.<sup>81</sup> The behaviour of senior officials in the departments largely determines whether departments sincerely commit themselves to advancing horizontal policy agendas or merely pay lip service to the process.<sup>82</sup> Their principal, and effective, incentive to cooperate has been the explicit consideration of departments' contributions to their horizontal policy initiatives in calculating Deputy Ministers' performance pay. In Alberta, performance pay constitutes 20 percent of Deputy Ministers' total compensation and, of this, 75 percent is based on their performance on the horizontal initiatives, which is assessed, in part, based on feedback from central agencies.<sup>83</sup> As well, as of 2002-03, 15 percent of Assistant Deputy Ministers' compensation is performance pay and half of this is based on their performance on horizontal initiatives.<sup>84</sup> This creates meaningful incentives to focus on making the government's horizontal initiatives a success, even if it requires the reallocation of some resources away from achieving the goals of the department's business plan.<sup>85</sup>

Public consultation is also an important part of horizontal policy-making in Alberta. Client groups are brought into the policy process by the partnering departments, particularly the lead departments, and help to identify emerging priorities and contribute to the government's policy thinking on how to respond.<sup>86</sup> The client groups view the government's efforts at horizontal policy-making positively, because it brings government departments and stakeholders together in policy-making to achieve clearly identified results, and, in exchange, they become stronger partners with government in advancing a shared agenda.<sup>87</sup> As well, the government's overall performance on its horizontal initiatives is assessed by an External Review Committee of five people from outside government, which provides a report to Cabinet on the results achieved and a recommendation on the level of performance bonuses to provide each year.<sup>88</sup>

This effort to create a more collaborative policy-making culture has improved the level of cooperation and focus on the government's overall agenda among Alberta departments, and it is beginning to generate tangible progress toward the targets of the various horizontal strategies.<sup>89</sup> The provincial government has also found that the greater policy consistency achieved through horizontal policy-making within the provincial government has led to improved intergovernmental coordination in support of the Alberta government's agenda.<sup>90</sup> Alberta officials recognize, however, that a substantial investment of time and resources is necessary for horizontal policy-making to work well. These must come both from line departments and, to

ensure that the momentum for horizontal policy-making is not lost, from the Premier's Office and Executive Council.<sup>91</sup>

### **A Comparative Perspective on Horizontal Policy-Making**

To fully assess the success of Canadian provinces in implementing horizontal, results-oriented policy-making and to understand the sources of their success, it is useful to review the experiences of some leading international jurisdictions. This study examines three, each for different reasons. The state of Oregon was the first jurisdiction in the United States to undertake a state-wide planning exercise to define key goals for not only the state government, but also for business and the civil society sector, with the introduction of *Oregon Shines* in 1989. It, and *Minnesota Milestones*, a similar state-wide strategic policy framework developed in Minnesota, were the inspirations for Saskatchewan's first experiments in horizontal, outcomes-focussed, policy development. These initial experiments, in turn, provided the basis for Saskatchewan's horizontal policy-making framework. The Labour government in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, was chosen not because it directly provided the inspiration for a provincial experiment in horizontal policy-making, but because the strength of that government's commitment to joined-up government (to use the British label) and the amount of careful thought that went into designing their joined-up government initiative demonstrate what is possible within a parliamentary system of government with a strongly ingrained culture of departmental independence.

The strategies that these jurisdictions have used to bring horizontal policy-making into the mainstream of public administration are remarkably similar to the strategies that Canadian provinces have used. As with the Canadian provinces, these jurisdictions have used all of the tools of strategic policy frameworks, central leadership, adaptation of government processes, and public engagement to make horizontal policy-making part of the culture and make it effective. Their experience, thus, reinforces the lessons one would draw from the experience of Canadian provinces and their success in implementing horizontal policy-making and delivery holds promise for Canadian jurisdictions.

a) *Oregon*

In response to a declining economy in the 1980s, then-Governor of Oregon, Neil Goldschmidt, charged a non-partisan group representing all stakeholders and levels of government in the state to analyse Oregon's problems and develop a strategic vision of the state in 2010.<sup>92</sup> This was to be accompanied by a state-wide, long-term strategic plan. This group's 1989 report, *Oregon Shines*, set a number of long-range, ambitious goals for the development of the state's human and natural resources. The report hit a responsive chord with both the public and the Oregon Legislature, and the Legislature established the Oregon Progress Board, headed by the Governor, to develop tangible measures that could be used to determine if the state was moving towards the goals set out in *Oregon Shines*.<sup>93</sup> To develop these measures, the Progress Board held 12 statewide meetings to assess the public's priorities for what should be measured and received written comments from over 200 organizations and individuals.<sup>94</sup> Upon the completion of its consultations, the Progress Board proposed 92 measures, called the "Oregon Benchmarks" in seven areas -- the economy, education, civic engagement, social support, public safety, community development, and the environment.<sup>95</sup> These were adopted by the Oregon Legislature in 1991, and the Progress Board published the first of its biennial report cards on the state's progress.<sup>96</sup>

*Oregon Shines* and the Oregon Benchmarks have provided the framework for further policy development and planning both at a statewide level in particular sectors and at a sub-state level. For example, Oregon developed a "Human Investment Partnership" to achieve a number of the goals of *Oregon Shines*. Specific benchmarks were established for 73 indicators of community health in nine categories -- nurturing families and healthy children, success in school, student health, high school to post-secondary educational attainment, adult education, adult skill proficiency, adult health, equal opportunity and social harmony, and adult independence and community participation.<sup>97</sup> The indicators have fostered specific strategies to improve Oregon's performance in each of these areas, and have served to improve the accountability of human development programs for results, change the state and local budgeting processes to recognize the future value of investments in increasing individuals' productivity, and generate a commitment to delivering more appropriate packages of services to clients of human services programs.<sup>98</sup> As well, Clackamas County's Commission on Children and Families has used *Oregon Shines* to create its own set of eleven benchmarks, which were built on the results of

community input through citizen committees and task forces, and uses these benchmarks to drive budgetary and program decisions at the county level, while Tillamook County directed those county agencies delivering Healthy Start services for children to collaborate and provide coordinated services, as a way of maximizing the county's performance against the Oregon Benchmarks.<sup>99</sup>

Given the change in Oregon's economy between 1989 and 1996, the Governor formed a 46-person task force in April 1996 to recommend changes to *Oregon Shines*.<sup>100</sup> The task force held ten regional meetings with over 400 participants, used these comments to systematically revise the 1991 benchmarks, and published *Oregon Shines II* as a draft for public comment, before revising it and releasing it in January 1997.<sup>101</sup> *Oregon Shines II* built on the experience gained in outcomes-based measurement as a result of the *Oregon Shines* project to reduce the number of benchmarks and clearly link the new benchmarks to the findings from the task force's consultations and its analysis.<sup>102</sup>

Meanwhile, the original *Oregon Shines* had attracted the attention of United States federal government officials and, in December 1994, the federal, Oregon, and local governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding establishing the "Oregon Option".<sup>103</sup> The Oregon Option was designed as a long-term effort to create an outcomes-based approach to intergovernmental policy and service delivery, thereby creating a new intergovernmental relationship based on shared goals and a commitment to partnership.<sup>104</sup> The first test of the Oregon Option was an initiative to raise two-year-olds' immunization rates from 53 percent to 90 percent.<sup>105</sup> Federal, state, and local governments and non-profit partners first met to discuss how to achieve this target and to identify barriers to performance.<sup>106</sup> In response to the partnership's concerns, the federal government reduced their regular reporting requirements and merged six separate funding streams, while the state and local partners launched a massive campaign to seek out unimmunized children.<sup>107</sup> They were assisted in this task by corporate donations, free air time provided by broadcasters, and health-care systems, which surveyed two-year-old to determine actual immunization rates and the reasons for the poor coverage.<sup>108</sup> As a consequence, the immunization rates climbed from 47 percent in 1991 to 67 percent in 1996, and they have continued to rise.<sup>109</sup>

b) *Minnesota*

The State of Minnesota followed Oregon's cue soon after the publication of the original *Oregon Shines* and Oregon Benchmarks and established a process to develop *Minnesota Milestones*, a 30-year plan for the state built around 20 goals and 79 "milestones" against which the state's progress on the goals could be measured.<sup>110</sup> 10,000 Minnesotans participated in the planning process, through 45 meetings in various locations across the state, responses to mail-out surveys and the distribution of draft documents.<sup>111</sup> *Minnesota Milestones* was published in December 1992 and progress reports have been published in 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2002.<sup>112</sup> *Minnesota Milestones* rapidly and directly affected the budgets of state agencies; since the 1994-95 fiscal year, state agencies have been required to prepare biennial performance reports for the Legislature based on the *Minnesota Milestones* goals and objectives and the state government budget has been developed by reference to the *Minnesota Milestones* performance measures.<sup>113</sup> As well, starting in 1998, state agencies were required to report on the performance of individual programs.<sup>114</sup>

As occurred in Oregon, *Minnesota Milestones* has spawned horizontal initiatives in particular sectors statewide and has led the Minnesota Legislature to provide incentives to local governments to develop performance reporting systems and undertake horizontal, results-based policy-making at the local level.<sup>115</sup> One example of a horizontal policy initiative created because of the existence of *Minnesota Milestones* was Minnesota's Sustainable Development Initiative. This was developed by a 105-member group of business, environmental and community leaders who defined objectives in agriculture, energy, forestry, minerals, manufacturing, recreation, and settlement.<sup>116</sup> These were contained in a 1995 report, *Challenges for a Sustainable Minnesota*, and led to state legislation in 1996 that established an advisory Round Table of business, environmental, and community leaders to keep the initiative on course, required state agencies to assess programs against sustainable development criteria, and integrated environmental protection into land use planning.<sup>117</sup> The Round Table, which is appointed by the Governor, is mandated to serve as a catalyst for sustainable development, foster public and private partnerships, and involve citizens in decision-making.<sup>118</sup> It is assisted by an Environmental Quality Board, which is a policy forum of the heads of nine state environmental agencies, five citizens, a representative of the Governor, and Minnesota Planning, the organization responsible for *Minnesota Milestones*.<sup>119</sup> This board develops policy, creates long-range plans, reviews

proposed projects that would significantly affect the environment, and performs a range of other, regulatory responsibilities.<sup>120</sup>

c) *United Kingdom*

The United Kingdom has likely become the leading jurisdiction in promoting horizontal policy-making, or "joined-up government", since the election of the Labour Party in 1997. Its efforts to foster joined-up policy-making and delivery have caused policy-making, budgeting, auditing, information systems and even government organization itself to become more holistic.<sup>121</sup> This effort began early in Labour's first mandate. Prime Minister Tony Blair established numerous task forces with cross-departmental mandates and participation from outside government; he also established the Social Exclusion Unit and Performance and Innovation Unit within "Number 10" (the British term for the Prime Minister's Office) in 1997, by seconding officials from departments and bringing in people with applicable experience outside government, and gave them broad, cross-departmental mandates.<sup>122</sup> Blair also indicated the importance that joined-up government would have to a Labour administration in a speech to a conference of senior civil servants in late 1998, in which he made it clear that senior management would be judged, above all, on its efforts to increase the integration of policy-making and delivery across departmental lines.<sup>123</sup>

Labour's March 1999 White Paper *Modernizing Government* and the April 1999 Comprehensive Spending Review, however, really signalled the start of the Labour government's serious, coordinated effort to make joined-up government a reality.<sup>124</sup> These reforms have been driven by a partnership between central agencies that reflects the key partnership within the British Cabinet itself: that between Blair and Chancellor Gordon Brown. The Cabinet Office and Number 10 have been critical to advancing this agenda. Blair created the Performance and Innovation Unit, for example, to be a focal point for innovative thinking on current issues and approaches to public management, including knowledge transfer from overseas.<sup>125</sup> To achieve this, he established a unit that operates in small teams of individuals from both inside and outside government, working with departments on cross-cutting, innovative projects designed to improve the effectiveness of government policies and their delivery in fields in which policy thinking has traditionally be constrained by either a lack of coordination or a strong departmental "conventional

wisdom".<sup>126</sup> An important element in the Performance and Innovation Unit's ability to foster innovation in such an environment is its direct reporting relationship to Number 10.

The Cabinet Office has also developed other tools to foster joined-up working across government. The appointment of Permanent Secretaries (the British equivalent of Canadian Deputy Ministers) has provided an opportunity to establish the importance of horizontal policy-making. The British civil service competency framework, for example, set targets for the percentage of senior civil servants with cross-departmental experience and experience outside central government, while cross-departmental responsibilities are an explicit part of the objectives contained in each new Permanent Secretary's contract; Permanent Secretaries' performance is assessed, and bonuses provided, against those objectives.<sup>127</sup> The Cabinet Office has also undertaken a number of initiatives to support innovative, joined-up policy-making. It encourages departments to sign interdepartmental Memoranda of Understanding that set out their roles and responsibilities in cross-departmental initiatives, the Centre for Management and Policy Studies within the Cabinet Office has developed a strong program to support Ministers and civil servants in developing the leadership qualities necessary to effectively make cross-departmental policy and manage horizontal initiatives, and UK Online has established a central register of consultations and created a website on best practices in consultations, to assist civil servants in more effectively engaging citizens in policy development.<sup>128</sup>

The other half of this central agency partnership, the Treasury, has been much more involved in policy-making in the Blair government than it ever had been previously.<sup>129</sup> It has sought to promote joined-up government through the establishment of new policy teams, Public Services Agreements with departments, the creation of a Public Services Productivity Panel, the creation of an accounting and budgetary framework within which joined-up policy-making and delivery can operate, and by creating pooled budgets, controlled by the Treasury, for broad policy objectives.<sup>130</sup> The most important innovations from the Treasury, however, have likely been the £50 million Policy Innovation Fund, which was established as part of the 2000 Comprehensive Spending Review, and the Invest to Save Budget, which is jointly administered by the Cabinet Office and the Treasury.<sup>131</sup> Both funds are designed to provide monies for joint projects; the Invest to Save Budget is specifically targeted to projects that are too high-risk for any single department to undertake on its own but which may provide significant gains to the wider public sector.<sup>132</sup>

These central agency innovations have generated several new horizontal policy initiatives, such as "SureStart" (early childhood development), the "New Deal for Communities" and "Local Strategic Partnerships" (both of which are community development initiatives) and the "Rough Sleepers Initiative" (homelessness). These initiatives demonstrate several common characteristics: local communities are involved throughout the policy development and delivery process, clear outcomes-focussed goals are established against which the performance of initiatives can be assessed, partnerships are developed at the local level, centralized funding is provided to the local partnerships to support initiatives, and best practices from the initiatives are disseminated to other initiatives.<sup>133</sup> Amalgamating previously disparate initiatives into a coherent, focussed, and effective cross-departmental strategy, engaging local governments, service delivery agents, clients, and citizens in the design of the strategy, and building the capacity of service delivery agents (which are often voluntary organizations) to engage in both policy formulation and implementation are critical components of joined-up government initiatives.<sup>134</sup>

### **Conclusion: Key Lessons for Horizontal Policy-Making**

Despite their different democratic and public administration traditions and cultures, all jurisdictions studied, whether in Canada or elsewhere, have developed remarkably similar processes for fostering horizontal policy-making within government and society. This should not be completely surprising, however, when one considers that each of the jurisdictions was seeking to achieve the same public administration goal of better coordinating government, and better connecting it to other social actors and citizens, to more effectively respond to challenging, multifaceted social problems. A number of common themes, which can serve as lessons for public administrators seeking to put in place horizontal policy-making initiatives and create a more joined-up bureaucratic culture, can be drawn from their experience.

The first lesson is that a clearly articulated strategic framework of goals and specific, results-oriented benchmarks is essential for keeping governments and their partners outside government focussed on achieving the results that citizens are seeking. All of the jurisdictions reviewed have identified strategic goals and have either identified specific benchmarks against which to measure progress or are committed to developing them as part of the development of their horizontal policies. Indeed, in the cases of Newfoundland, Ontario, Oregon, and

Minnesota, these strategic frameworks have taken the form of comprehensive jurisdiction-wide plans. The degree to which these strategic frameworks clearly articulate measurable outcomes, however, varies. It will be interesting in future years to determine what effect the clarity and measurability of the desired outcomes had on the governments' ongoing commitment to horizontal policy-making and delivery.

A strategic framework is not self-executing, however; politicians and officials must both exercise leadership and reform the processes by which government's decisions are made to encourage a more holistic and results-oriented focus to government. To change a bureaucratic culture, leadership, in the form of an insistence on horizontal policy development and support for horizontal policy-making, must come first from the government's political masters and central agencies. This is the lesson of several of the jurisdictions reviewed. In the United Kingdom, for example, a majority of government policy-makers surveyed identified Ministers and the senior civil service as the key drivers of change.<sup>135</sup> Prince Edward Island is remarkable for the degree to which the momentum came from the collective leadership of Deputy Ministers across the government but, even there, Executive Council direction and support played a significant role in translating intentions into action.<sup>136</sup> Leaders at the centre need to clearly state that horizontal policy-making is important and demonstrate their own depth of commitment to it, for example by providing support, encouragement and information or knowledge to departments that are attempting to work more horizontally. Indeed, in the British survey of policy-makers, inadequate training budgets was identified as a barrier to horizontal policy-making.<sup>137</sup> The United Kingdom also provides a clear example of the importance of a partnership between policy-oriented central agencies (Executive Councils in Canadian provinces) and budgeting central agencies in sending the bureaucracy a clear message that it will take seriously. A significant factor in Saskatchewan's inability to realize on the early promise of its efforts at horizontal policy-making would seem to be the lack of commitment on the part of the Treasury Board branch of Saskatchewan Finance to reinforce, through the budget process, the importance of undertaking horizontal policy-making.

Political and central agency leadership must also be sustained. Changing systems of governance and, more importantly, the underlying bureaucratic cultures that fostered those systems takes time. One of the most important indicators of success of *Oregon Shines*, as well as one of the key factors that contributed to its success, was that it was able to earn bipartisan

support in the Oregon Legislature that allowed the inevitably slow process of learning new ways of undertaking public administration to survive administration changes.<sup>138</sup> This holds out promise for such horizontal initiatives as the Strategic Social Plan in Newfoundland and Labrador and Smart Growth in Ontario, which have survived changes in government. In contrast, Perri 6 et al have identified impatience, especially among politicians, to see results from horizontal policy-making as one of Labour's key problems in implementing joined-up government in the United Kingdom.<sup>139</sup> If political and central agency leadership is not sustained, the previous bureaucratic cultural paradigm will inevitably reassert itself and departmental officials will simply dismiss the attempt at horizontal policy innovation as a passing fad.

Leadership alone, however, will not magically transform government processes. Part of leadership necessary to implement horizontal policy-making and policy implementation is consciously transforming the processes of government, to create structural incentives for previously independent departments to cooperate. The experience of all of the jurisdictions reviewed suggests that four procedural innovations are particularly valuable. The first important innovation is creating a results-based reporting and accountability process. This not only allows government departments and their partners to review their performance against the established benchmarks and refine their initiatives over time, but it creates an incentive to those agencies to remain focussed on society's goals, and it keeps citizens engaged in the processes of governance, which should increase the legitimacy of governance over time. While it has not been without its challenges, *Oregon Shines*, with its emphasis on innovation and accountability for results, has persuaded both governmental and non-governmental agencies to integrate benchmarks into state and local planning processes.<sup>140</sup> This seems also to be the case in the Canadian jurisdictions, most notably Newfoundland and Alberta. The intergovernmental Oregon Option Memorandum of Understanding has also begun to build intergovernmental accountability mechanisms, though progress has been slow.<sup>141</sup> The British report *Wiring It Up* also highlighted the importance of putting in place the right structure of accountability and incentives for cross-departmental policy-making.<sup>142</sup> What a reporting and accountability process will reveal, however, is that there is never enough data available. While imperfect data should never be allowed to stand in the way of progress, as the Alberta Deputy Minister of Executive Council made clear,<sup>143</sup> the more data that can be made available, especially if it can be provided at a regional or community-specific level as well as jurisdiction-wide, the more an accountability process is likely to stimulate local

policy innovations. Newfoundland and Labrador would seem to be the most advanced jurisdiction in Canada on this front.

In exchange for creating a more rigorous, results-oriented reporting and accountability process, governments need to reduce their demands for procedural reporting and centralized decision-making on policy implementation, especially when these demands are imposed on non-governmental service delivery agents. This is the second important procedural innovation. One of the basic premises behind most horizontal management processes, and one of the reasons for engaging local governments, non-governmental organizations and citizens in horizontal policy-making, is that those closest to the local manifestations of social problems may actually have the best understanding of those problems and the most promising ideas for innovative policies and services to address them. Thus, local service delivery agents need to be given scope to innovate in how they address results benchmarks, while still being required to report on how well, and how cost-effectively, they have done in moving towards their achievement. As Perri 6 et al have noted:

While central government has the right and the duty to set the direction and the goals, it is at the front line of executive agencies operating locally that the knowledge, the capability and the practical networks necessary for successful reform will be found. The centre needs to learn from the locality about implementation, just as the local level need to learn from the centre about commitment to the goals of reform.<sup>144</sup>

Both Oregon and Minnesota have found that focussing divergent civil society groups on goals, rather than processes, and allowing for multiple strategies to achieve the goals has helped to overcome rivalries between different groups and build relationships among them.<sup>145</sup> As well, the addition of results reporting on top of already burdensome process reporting is likely to discourage non-governmental partners, which are critical to the success of any horizontal policy process, from becoming partners in a horizontal initiative.

The third process innovation is to the budgeting process. Bardach has commented that:

The protectionist system of budget categories is one of the most severe limits on the possible scope of interagency collaboration. It is what helped create the fragmentation that now motivates [collaboration] efforts, and it is also what blocks those efforts from succeeding.<sup>146</sup>

Using the budget process to create incentives for departments to cooperate, for example by creating pooled budgets for horizontal policy initiatives, has been a common response of several of the Canadian jurisdictions and of all three international jurisdictions reviewed; it seems to be an effective incentive for formerly separate departments to cooperate. Bardach has certainly suggested that the Oregon Legislature's commitment to reinvest welfare savings in workforce attachment initiatives almost certainly reinforced efforts among different partners to make their collaboration produce results.<sup>147</sup> Both Ontario and Nova Scotia officials have recognized the value of the budget as an incentive to cooperate and, as noted earlier, the lack of adaptation of Saskatchewan's budget process to create incentives for departments to collaborate is likely the single most significant contributor to Saskatchewan's difficulties in creating a horizontal policy-making culture within the provincial government. Prince Edward Island proved unique among those governments whose officials were interviewed in successfully developing and implementing policies horizontally without having to rely on formal incentives either for departments, through the budget process, or for Deputy Ministers, through performance pay; this apparent anomaly can likely be explained by the extremely small size of the province and its government, which reasonably should result in greater collegiality and cohesion than is the case in larger provinces with larger government bureaucracies. In the other cases, the truism that "money talks" is borne out by both provincial and international experience.

The fourth innovation is also designed to encourage departments to cooperate, in this case by providing significant recognition and performance bonuses to senior management and staff who encourage interdepartmental cooperation and make such cooperation work effectively. Such innovations transform the typical professional incentives that encourage focussing strictly on one's department's interests, to make the government's overall interests in addressing cross-cutting social issues as important to an individual officials' career goals. Alberta has gone the furthest in formalizing such incentives of any jurisdiction in Canada, though other jurisdictions, such as Saskatchewan, have built this consideration into Deputy Ministers' performance reviews in a more *ad hoc* way. Of the international jurisdictions reviewed, the British government has been particularly concerned that its system of performance appraisal and pay for the civil service has traditionally focussed almost exclusively on individual achievement. It is seeking to change this, however, and place greater emphasis on skills such as leadership, strategic management, project management, change management, and building stakeholder relationships, which are

essentially to effectively managing horizontal policy-making.<sup>148</sup> The British government has also added a further incentive by setting the goal for the government that a certain percentage of Permanent Secretaries have cross-departmental experience or experience outside government.

The last common theme in the experiences of all the jurisdictions is that citizen engagement, and the engagement of civil society organizations, is an essential component of horizontal policy-making. This makes sense for several reasons. First, even the most conscientious government official will have a limited and imperfect understanding of a problems, so citizen engagement can fill in gaps in officials' understanding of a problem and make the policy responses better. Secondly, public and stakeholder engagement in policy-making should make the policy outcomes more legitimate and strengthen the commitment of citizens and stakeholders to making policy implementation a success, by creating a shared vision and sense of purpose. An understanding of the inability of government acting alone to meet society's goals, and the concomitant need for the private sector, community leaders, and non-governmental organizations to assist government in addressing social problems was at the heart of the innovations to improve the quality of public consultations and better engage citizens in policy-making in all three international jurisdictions reviewed.<sup>149</sup> Thirdly, citizen and stakeholder engagement can generate a level of commitment among the public that makes it difficult to either undermine a horizontal policy initiative from within the bureaucracy or repudiate it with a change of administration. Certainly the fact that the Oregon Progress Board is chaired by the Governor of the state and includes representation from all levels of government and business and civic leaders gives the Progress Board a strong claim to authority and legitimacy, as well as visibility.<sup>150</sup> All of the Canadian jurisdictions reviewed regularly undertake high-quality public consultations, but a number of the jurisdictions, such as Saskatchewan, with the Northern Development Board, Newfoundland and Labrador, with the Premier's Council on Social Development, Ontario, with its Smart Growth panels, and Alberta, with its External Review Committee, have gone the way of jurisdictions such as Oregon and Minnesota by establishing standing committees of stakeholders and members of the public to participate in the horizontal policy process on an ongoing basis.

These innovations are designed to achieve certain results, however, so one must ask what they have actually achieved in the jurisdictions in which horizontal policy-making has been implemented. While major policy initiatives designed to make significant changes in serious,

multi-faceted social problems generally take years to demonstrate progress, those jurisdictions that have had horizontal policy initiatives in place for some time and have seriously implemented the public administration changes necessary to make them effective have started to see some improvement in social outcomes. Oregon's improvement in child immunization rates is likely the best example of a tangible change in outcomes generated by a collaborative policy-making and policy implementation process; this result alone should be enough to give governments in Canada some confidence that horizontal policy-making can work.

The effects of horizontal policy-making on the bureaucratic culture of a government and the political culture of a jurisdiction, on the other hand, are being seen much more quickly. The officials interviewed in all of the Canadian jurisdictions are seeing a steady increase in their bureaucracies' understanding of the complexity of the issues they are trying to address through horizontal policies and commitment to work together to develop solutions, in recognition that no one group or area of expertise is capable of solving serious, multi-faceted social issues. This tends to correlate with the extent to which the process innovations described above have been implemented, but even Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan, the jurisdictions with the weakest structural incentives to cooperate, have seen an increase in the motivation of officials to collaborate and coordinate to better, and more efficiently, achieve their public policy goals. More importantly, though, horizontal policy-making is increasingly bringing citizens and stakeholders into the act of governing their societies through deliberative processes and fostering a new respect among government officials for the valuable role that citizens can play in policy-making. In democratic societies, this may be the most important contribution of horizontal policy-making to the quality of modern governance.

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- <sup>1</sup> Donald F. Kettl, "Managing Indirect Government" in Lester M. Salamon, ed., *The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 494.
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